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Китай и Российская Федерация: политика в 1991–1999 годах

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Аннотация. В 1989 г. произошли значительные перемены государственного устройства многих стран. Падение Берлинской стены, которое приобрело символическое значение, либертарианские события в Польше привели к свержению авторитарной власти этих и ряда других государств. В странах, которые были подавлены тоталитарными режимами после Второй мировой войны, восторжествовали демократия и закон. Эти процессы также затронули Россию и Китай. В 1990–1991 гг. Михаил Горбачёв стал первым президентом Советского Союза и автором «перестройки» – попытки серьёзной трансформации в СССР. События 17 апреля 1989 г. в Китае на площади Тяньаньмэнь свидетельствовали о стремлении студентов и общества к демократизации, экономическому развитию и борьбе с коррупцией. Последнее десятилетие XX в. чрезвычайно интересно для исследователей и историков, которые пытаются ответить на многие вопросы о том периоде. Например, как Россия и Китай попали в «водоворот» новой политической и экономической реальности, сложились ли их отношения на новой политической сцене мира? КНР и РФ, которые принадлежат к числу самых значимых игроков на геополитической карте мира, обладают большим демографическим и ресурсным потенциалом, а потому исследование основных векторов изменений в них необходимо в контексте исследования глобальных трансформаций. Эти страны также важны в геополитике, поэтому важно изучить их партнёрство с Соединёнными Штатами. Несмотря на то, что 1991–1999 гг. характеризуются конструктивным партнёрством и укреплением сотрудничества между Россией и Китаем, стоит взглянуть на эти отношения в большей перспективе.

Ключевые слова: Китай, Россия, политика, демократия, экономика, партнёрство.

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China and Russian Federation: Policy From 1991 to 1999

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Abstract. 1989 was a time of a breakthrough for many countries and countries around the world. The symbolic fall of the Berlin Wall and the libertarian events in Poland have led to a coup in the authoritarian rule of many countries. Democracy and the rule of law began to function in countries that were overwhelmed by totalitarian regimes after World War II. These processes have also affected Russia and China. In 1990–1991 Mikhail Gorbachev was the only president of the Soviet Union and author of the perestroika, which is a major change in present-day Russia. The events of the 17th of April, 1989 in China in Tiananmen Square also show the aspirations of students and society to democratize and economic development and the fight against corruption. The time of the last decade of the 20th century is extremely interesting for historians and

researchers and raises many interesting questions. The questions are about how in the new political and economic reality have the countries affected by these changes found themselves? And how did the relationship on the new political scene of the world have come into place? Two very important countries Russia and China will be particularly examined in this article. Due to their importance and population potential and resource efficiency, it is important to look for important vectors of change. These countries are also important in geopolitics, so it is important to examine them in their relations with the United States. Despite the fact that the years 1991–1999 are characterised by constructive partnerships and strengthening cooperation between Russia and China, it is worth looking at these relations in a broader perspective.

Keywords: China, Russia, politics, democracy, economy, partnership.

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Introduction

Soviet-Chinese relations after a determined approach to the West practically froze and their normalization did not take place until 1989. The year of 1989 was very important for the whole world and Russia and China especially. In the West, the fall of the Berlin Wall is remembered on the 9th of November [Judt: 741–742]. But there were also very important events in the East. It should be considered that after a long period of 35 years, the normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations occurred only as a result of Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Beijing on the 16th of May, 1989 [Brunet: 133]. Mikhail Gorbachev as the new president quickly proceeded to quickly create his own political and organizational background, in which he appointed supporters of perestroika, among whom was Aleksander Yakovlev. Yakovlev was appointed in 1987 as a member of the Political Bureau and was an intellectual architect of the reconstruction and glasnost [Gruszczak: 619, 624–625]. The dissolution of the USSR began, which was a worrying lesson for China. The events of Tiananmen Square [Leonard: 82] were associated with Gorbachev, but even worse was thought of Yeltsin. Bill Clinton has written: “Yeltsin has had to deal with strong opposition in the country... Yeltsin destroyed the old system, but he has not yet built a new one” [Clinton: 466]. In the face of internal problems in Russia, an important element in all this for China was the signing of the Border Agreement of May, 1991, the majority of the disputed islands on Amur China were granted. However, more than a dozen areas did not have a certain affiliation until 2008. Gradually, the collapse of the USSR has reduced the importance of the country. On the other hand, there has been a huge economic growth in China. China has gradually gained an advantage over Russia in its relations [Lubina: 55–56].

The changes that took place at the time, predicted by Professor J. Xiong of New York University in an analysis of a scientific paper, when he wrote that American involvement in the world would result in a response from both Russia and China [Давыдов: 151]. And Alexander Yakovlev writes that “US foreign policy has evolved ... Since fostering international relaxation, normalisation of Soviet-American relations in the early 1970s, the United States have been promoted to the leadership. In the 20th century the U.S. moved on to the opposite course at the end of that decade” [Jakowlew: 277]. After the collapse of the USSR, a new phase of relations between Russia and China began. The Russian Federation has become the legal successor of the USSR, took over just half of the population, 4/5 of the territory, a unique strategic position, large human and nuclear resources and raw materials. However, Russia has not maintained its status as a power, it has fallen to the rank of regional and medium-sized powers. In a sense, Russia has become a unique

so-called “red line” of the “Eurasian power”. Meanwhile, China's fate has changed positively. Rogacev writes that new trends have emerged and there has been a normalization of mutual relations and China has emerged from isolation [Рогачёв: 6]. Wilson in his work: “Strategic Partners. Russian-Chinese Relations in the Post-Soviet Era”, described these changed positions of the states as follows: “Russia was the heir to the power and China an emerging power” [Fullilove: 63–85]. Andrei Davydov also describes this situation: “After the collapse of the Soviet Union, which could not withstand the burden of commitments as a result of a series of miscalculations, China was the first to recognize the Russian Federation as the legal successor of the USSR” [Давыдов: 20].

In the last decade of the XXth century Russia was ruled by President Boris Yeltsin, who came to power with a program of change. Yeltsin's rule can be divided into several stages: from August 1991 to October 1993 called the time of the first Russian Republic; From October 1993 to August 1998, Yeltsin gained more and more power, and from August 1998 to December 1999, when he began to withdraw [Riasanovsky, Steinberg: 657]. However, for the purpose of analysing Russian-Chinese relations, a different time frame was used. It should be emphasized that Russian-Chinese relations were the result of Soviet-Chinese relations and proposed by Michal Lubina the following breakdown of these relations within the framework of 1991–1999. The first period from desinterest to constructive partnership from 1991 to 1994, the second period from constructive to strategic partnership 1994–1996 and the third is a partnership in the last years of the 20th century [Lubina: 57].

Relations between Russia and China from desinterest to constructive partnership

During this first period, relations with China came to the fore for Russia, which was granted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs itself in Russia in 1992. Reformers and, in particular, Andrei Kozyrev, saw the concept of Russia's foreign policy aimed at common interests with the US and Western Europe. Integration with Western civilization was also not excluded. A group of people around Kozyrev dreamed of normalizing Russia as bringing it closer to western standards. In December of 1992 Yeltsin considered it necessary to replace the charisma-free, unpopular Egor Gaidar with the less radical Viktor Chernomyrdin. [Bartlett: 354]. The aim was not only to strengthen democracy but to help and invest for Russia. For this team of people, China has been lower in priorities than Japan, India or South Korea [Lubina: 58]. To the USA it was important to weaken Russia's position in the world, so cooperation with China proved to be very important and of great strategic importance to Russia. China has rapidly embarked on a path of cooperation with Russia [Давыдов: 199].

China in this first period considered normalization with its neighbors and vigilance in the South China Sea region as its main activity. The Chinese were not well-minded to Boris Yeltsin because he was the cause of the collapse of the USSR. Yeltsin, on the other hand, remembered various Chinese affronts at the end of the Soviet Union's existence. Despite this, the Chinese have sought to maintain good contacts with Russia, which has guaranteed them security from the north in the current situation. The concerns came from the possibility of Russia being incorporated into the Western World, which would be detrimental to China in the face of being the last socialist power. Concerns were quickly dispelled by the diplomatic contacts that turned into personal meetings. This was reflected in the meeting at the highest level, which took place on the 31st January, 1992 during the UNSC session. The President of the Russian Federation Yeltsin and the Prime Minister of the People's Republic of China Li Peng confirmed their willingness to cooperate with each other and

friendly relations. There was a call to respect Russia's prior agreement with China signed by the USSR. In February of 1992 the Eastern Border Agreement was ratified for, the first time the border was legally established [Wilson: 25].

In 1992, trade and economic relations agreements were signed, with the status of the highest priority and cooperation in the military technical sphere. There were many meetings between different people from the administration and the state levels. In late 1992, Foreign Minister Kozyriev stated that China had been incorporated into a preferential position in Russia's policy [Li Jingjie: 75]. This term testified to China's importance in Russia's policy. In addition to political contacts, Chinese and Russian researchers also visited each other. The first joint conference of Chinese and Russian scientists was held in Beijing on the 11–13 November, 1992: “Sino-Russian relations in the modern stage” [Lubina: 61].

An important event in mutual relations was also the Yeltsin Declaration acknowledging China's unity and that Taiwan was considered a part of China. It has been declared that the Russian side will not maintain any contacts with the authorities in Taipei. Boris Yeltsin went to Beijing during an unfavourable internal situation where major part of the nationalist opposition was not satisfied with the pro-Western foreign policy. No particularly important effects were seen in relation to the “Atlantis” policy. It was also convenient for China, because they were isolated after the events in Tiananmen Square. During his two-day visit, a Declaration on the principles of relations between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China was signed. This declaration has filled the void since 1980, the moment the Soviet-Chinese Treaty of 1950 expired. The declaration underlines friendly relations and China doesn't want to achieve hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region, highlighting the importance of the UN. According to Li Jingjie, it was a mini-treaty [Lubina: 63].

In addition to this declaration, a number of other agreements and documents were signed. Although most of them have been on paper, two documents have their weight. The presence of troops and offensive weapons in the region were reduced and a 200 km-wide trust zone was built along the border. Russia supported China building nuclear electricity plants and rebuilding the Chinese complex industry from 1950's to the 20th century. Thus, Yeltsin's visit was a success and marked the introduction of Russian-Chinese relations into a new era. The Chinese have found that Yeltsin's anti-communism has no anti-Chinese attitude. The director of the Russian Institute of the Far East, Mikhail Titarenko, said that from then on, Russia and China understood that they were not threatening each other but could support mutually. Russian-Chinese contacts have been very revitalised, especially in the economic sphere. Especially according to Rogachev, China can be helpful for those regions of Russia where there is a deficit of semi-finished products [Рогачёв: 41]. China's average GDP growth rate during the reform years was quite high, and in terms of GDP growth, China ranked first in the world between 1979 and 2010 at 9,9 %. Between 1991 and 2010 alone, the rate was 10,5 %. During the 32 years of reforms, GDP has grown in 115 times [Островский: 5].

China took the place of Russia's second trading partner in 1992. An important trade turned out to be arms trade. However, political dialogue, interparliamentary contacts and regional-level meetings have developed contacts of the population, restricted by the introduction of visas in January of 1994. It is significant that on the 14th of November, 1993, the Third Plenum 14 of the Communist Party Central Committee adopted a resolution called “Decision on issues related to the establishment of a socialist market economy system”. And The November's Economist reported that competition is entering all spheres of economic activity in China [Wu Xiaobo: 92–93]. Numerous political delegations were sent between 1993 and 1994 in 1994, a Protocol on

consultations between the foreign ministries of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China was signed in Beijing. On the same day, the 27th of January, 1994, Kozyrev announced the rediscovery of China for Russia. From that point on, it can be said that Russia has re-interested in the Asia-Pacific region [Lubina: 66].

From constructive to strategic partnership

The next stage was 1994–1996, Li Jingjie stressed that the formula of “constructive partnership” was the foundation of the long-term and stable development of Russian-Chinese relations. In these years the three most important characteristics were: institutionalisation of relations, internationalisation of bilateral relations (global issues were discussed) and continuous progress in addressing growing problems [Li Jingjie: 87]. During the constructive partnership, Jiang Zemin, president of the PRC, visited Russia from the 2–6 of September, 1994 in Moscow. Relations between Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin had become very close and friendly. Later sick Yeltsin was visited by the Chinese leader in the hospital [Abkowicz: 43].

After the 14th of November, The Economist reported that competition is entering all spheres of economic activity in China NATO's enlargement to the east and the infiltration of Central Asia were poorly read in Moscow. Rogachev writes that this fact was important for the strategic partnership [Рогачёв: 42]. China has proven to be one of the few areas that could be counted on and supporting the political class. Russia's growing role in the Asia-Pacific region has been a counterweight to Russia's marginalisation in Europe. Russia has gained prominence? in regional structures such as APEC, ASEAN and ASEM. Yeltsin stated that there was no alternative for Russia, it was necessary to pursue policy in the West as well as in the East. Rogachev wrote about the possibility of building such a bridge to the West and East. China also thought the same [Рогачёв: 6]. Therefore, despite not very sympathetic thinking about the West, the idea of looking pragmatic on the “triangle” of the US, China and Russia returned after the Cold War [Lubina: 69]. However, there is a delicate difference, China left itself room for manoeuvre and refused to enter pacts against the United States, but only wanted to strengthen its position [Halizak: 720]. The former's agreement was to engage constructively and defend endangered interests in the Russian Far East. Thus, the views of the two countries was the Joint Russian-Chinese Declaration of 1994, signed on the 3d of September, 1994, which was not an alliance and was not directed against anyone. In addition, the parties signed a number of other documents on the same day: a joint statement by the President of the Federation of Russia and the President of the People's Republic of China. Important documents were: A joint statement of non-targeting with strategic missiles and an agreement on the western stretch of the Russian-Chinese border closing a multi-year period of regulation between Russia and China [Lubina: 70]. Rogachev mentions that both sides strictly complied with the 1991 and 1994 border agreements [Рогачёв: 40].

In 1995, the Chinese's nuclear tests cast a shadow over relations with each other. Therefore, Paul Graczov's talks with Chinese generals about the withdrawal of troops 100 km from the common border were not easy. The next year in 1996 was very important due to the presidential elections in Russia and the reconstruction of foreign policy, which is to move away from the unilateral, pro-Western “Atlantic” policy. Yevgeny Primakov presented this concept later called pragmatic or realistic at the 51st Session of the UN General Assembly on the 19th of January, 1996. He argued that even weakened Russia could balance US influence through the UN. During

Primakov's time, the concept of “multipolar world order” was created. In this concept, China was the key and Primakov himself was seen as the “Russian Kissinger”. Primakov was very well perceived in China and considered as a professional politician. He was considered an architect of rapprochement not only with China and India, but with the whole east. Primakov was the progenitor of this policy during Putin's time [Levin:70].

The third and final aspect of the period 1994-1996 was the “strategic partnership” of Moscow and Beijing. It was the second key political event in 1996. It took place during the third Russian-Chinese summit. Boris Yeltsin visited Peking 24-26 of April, 1996. Galenowich writes that the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the All-China Assembly of People's Representatives Qiao Shi said that politics towards China is one of Russia's priorities [Галенович: 118]. It was the time before the Russian presidential elections. A visit to China improved Yeltsin's quotations, which in Shanghai could highlight the successes of pragmatism policy. The second important element was mutual Russian-Chinese support against the West. Some called it a soft anti-Western alliance. It should be noted that Yeltsin's meeting with Yanti came shortly after the United States and Japan signed a declaration of common security in 1996. At the end of the historic and important meeting, the 1996 Joint Declaration of the Russian Federation and China introduced the term “strategic partnership” at the last moment [Buszyński: 266]. Although it was initially thought that this was a spontaneous gesture of Yeltsin, after a while the “strategic partnership” became more clear. Especially for China, this meant, in practice, the signing of agreements with countries that are relevant to the interests of the PRC. This fits into China's political traditions and that is how it must be understood. The economy and trade with other countries in China's culture are taking place from “top to down” and in Western societies “from bottom to top”. To put it bluntly, there must be a political decision first and then there may be economic, cultural or other agreements [Lubina: 70]. Boris Yeltsin understood this formula differently. He commented on this as a partnership between two countries with solid industrial, potential raw material and human potential. This perception was linked to Russia's political culture. Rychłowski in his work writes: “The Russians in psychological, cultural and emotional terms remain more attached to the west than to the East. They assess their successes and failures according to Western benchmarks” [Rychłowski: 309].

China, therefore, became not important for Russia by itself but as a partner against the United States. On the other hand, recognition by others is important for Russia in terms of thinking about itself. Boris Yeltsin once said that “respect from the West requires cooperation with China”. China has become a “bargaining chip for Russia”. The Chinese, at the same time, stressed that relations with Russia and the “strategic partnership” contained its three times not: not for confrontation, not for the alliance and not for the direction against someone [Chen Qimao: 297; Mondry: 135]. In addition, the strategic partnership is an example of Beijing's pragmatic and long-term relationship with Moscow.

In addition to signing the declaration, two more important issues were agreed at the summit. Yeltsin obtained Beijing's approval to join the 'Comprehensive Nuclear Weapons Test Ban Treaty', which enabled the signing of this Treaty at the next G8 meeting [Halizak: 593; Comprehensive...]. The second was the signing on the 26th of April, 1996 in Shanghai by five countries (China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) of a multilateral agreement to “strengthen mutual security and build military trust in border regions” [Kennedy 1994, p. 443; Lubina 2014, p. 81] in addition to other documents (on the creation of a “hot line”, on the protection of intellectual property rights, the peaceful use of nuclear energy, cooperation in the energy sphere, on the fight against drugs, about the reserve of Lake Chanka). As Dmitry Trientin writes, Chinese politics was in the 1990s

Russia's indisputable success, which is why the parallel “Cold War in the East” has been completed. For China, this was one of many signs of the country's growing role in the world [Российско-китайские отношения (справочная информация)]. However, despite this success, it should be stressed that these relations depended quite heavily on relations with the West and, in particular, the United States.[Słowikowski: 196].

Partnership in the last decade of the 20th century

The third sub-period from 1991 to 1999 concerns partnerships in the last years of the 20th century, i.e. 1996–1999. The result of mutual visits and especially Li Peng's was the agreement to build a 2 million kW nuclear power plant in Lianyungang. In addition, the Bank of China and the Russian Federal Bank agreed on cooperation. Russia, on the other hand, agreed to train Chinese cosmonauts, build a station and send a satellite. Regular meetings between the Russian and Chinese sides were also launched [Wishnick: 31]. Both sides feared that after the departure of Yeltsin and Deng Xiaoping, the internal situation of the countries would change and therefore sought to create strong ground for good relations, so that they could not change in the future. From the Soviet experience, Deng Xiaoping concluded that in the first place there could be no diplomatic and military confrontation alone but an economic advantage. Deng also knew that monetary protectionism was important to economic power [Brunet, Guichard: 14–15]. On the 19th of February, 1997, at the age of 93, the great statesman Deng Xiaoping died. He did not see Hong Kong returned to China in July, 1997 [Wu Xiaobo: 117]. China's next leader Jiang Zemin appeared after him.

One of the most important events at the time was Jiang Zemin's visit to Moscow. He was in Moscow for five days from the 22nd of April to the 25th of April, 1997. Jiang Zemin appeared in the Duma with a reading in which he presented the concept of a multipolar world and emphasized the strong ties between Russia and China, which was met with great appreciation in Moscow. A number of documents were signed: the Russian-Chinese Joint Declaration on the Multipolar World and the formation of a new international order and a multilateral, Russian-Sino-Kazakh-Kyrgyz-Tajik agreement to reduce mutual forces in the border area of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and China. Previously, neither Russia nor China signed similar documents with any other country. This should probably be interpreted as Russia's annexation to the Chinese concept of multipolarity. In support of this, we already have a joint declaration of the 23d of April, 1997, when Russia and China stressed, above all, the requirement to build a multipolar world. The declaration highlighted China's growing role while questioning the legitimacy of the United States' position as the only superpower. The concept of multipolarity was a Chinese concept, which Jiang Zemin introduced in Duma recognizing the Position of the U.S., but with the indication that his position would wane [Lubina: 85–86].

The second important document at the April summit was the agreement on mutual reduction of forces in the border area between Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and China throughout the border. As a result of the wax reduction, a large normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations was performed. Under the agreement, all countries agreed to reduce troops at the border. Despite the development of this cooperation between 1997 and 1998, the “strategic partnership” passed a clear test of credibility. In particular, it is about improving Sino-US and Russian-Japanese relations and the atomic race in South Asia and the financial crisis in Asia. It turned out that the scope of the partnership is not very broad [Lubina: 85–86].

The first element of improving relations on the China-US axis was a Jiang Zemin's visit to the US in 1997 and Bill Clinton's visit to China in 1998. Both visits were successful from a point of mutual and political relations. Cooperation with Russia has therefore slowed down somewhat. Despite this, Boris Yeltsin was in Beijing in 1997 where the demarcation of the eastern section of the Russian-Chinese border was signed, which aroused a major controversy in Russia itself [Rychłowski: 37]. It should also be added that when a telephone line between Russia and China was agreed, the operation of such a line between Beijing and Washington was suspended until 1998 [Tsyganov: 307]. Relations between Russia and China were well defined by the Chinese Ambassador to Moscow Li Fenglin, but he did it so little diplomatically, when he said that "there is cooperation between China and the US without sentimentality, and between China and Russia – sentimentality without cooperation" [Li Fenglin: 18].

At the end of the 20th century, it turned out that the agreements between Russia and China were not as strong as it seemed. Russia was still burdened by the dissolution of the USSR and acted short-term and rather ad hoc. In the West, no one bothered to establish Russia's new relationship with the East. China, on the other hand, looked more rationally, stable and long-term, taking into account the emergence of the Asia-Pacific region as the centre of the political world. So despite lively diplomatic relations and signed documents, it can be concluded that Russia and China have not treated cooperation with each other as the most important vector of politics. Between 1997 and 1998, it even became apparent that Russian-Chinese relations were largely limited to geopolitics. China's economic interests have also done much more with the United States than with Russia. Trade with the US amounted to 60 billion US dollars in 1998, while with Russia 5.8 billion US dollars. It was clear that the authorities in Beijing did not risk closer cooperation with Russia than with the US, because the losses would be huge. Russia, on the other hand, was counting on loans from the West to improve its economy. So Russia and China could do without each other, but cooperation with the United States was essential. Safronova shares the view that the Russian state tried to find an alternative to the Euro-Atlantic vector of its foreign policy and foreign economic course before 2012-2014. However, the interest in the foreign eastern vector had begun to develop in Russia, when China had been in a dynamic development phase since the late 1980s of the 20th century [Сафронова; 35–36].

At the very end of the 20th century, Russia and China protested together against the United States. Their protests concerned the use of force in Yugoslavia and opposition to NATO's decision of 13 October 1998 and the opposition of 19 December 1998 to the planned attack on Iraq without UN approval. In view of this, a joint statement on Russian-Chinese relations was signed on the threshold of the 21st century. Yeltsin's visit to Beijing on the 9-10 of December, 1999 was Yeltsin's last foreign visit. This visit closed the first period of political Russian-Chinese relations. On the 31st of December, 1999, Yeltsin announced his resignation as president of the Russian Federation, and a certain era ended. Bill Clinton writes that Yeltsin's decision was fully thought out [Clinton: 808].

Summary

As a result of significant events in the world in 1989, changes have taken place in the Soviet Union and in China. Since then, after a long break, you can see the coming new stage in relations between Russia and China. Russia has been downgraded its ranking in the class of regional powers and China has become an emerging power. The period 1991 to 1999 was significant in Beijing's

relations with Moscow. In these years, three subperiods can be distinguished, which are characteristic of the last decade of the 20th century. After a period of concern, relations with Russia have been revived. Yeltsin's personal contacts with Chinese leaders were of great merit. Yeltsin's relationship with Jiang Zemin became the basis of very good relationships. In addition, as Yakovlev mentions, Russia has changed its mindset as a result of NATO enlargement. In addition, Russia has changed its attitude as a result of NATO enlargement. Russia, disappointed by the United States' policy towards it, has changed course. This strong new direction was to strengthen relations with its close neighbour China. China, in addition to other factors, was also closer ideologically to Russia. Many agreements, declarations and treaties were signed. All this was intended not only to serve peace guarantees but also to contribute to economic development. As a result, Russia has strengthened its position in Asia by belonging to regional organisations such as APEC, ASEAN and ASEM. China, on the other hand, gained internationally. It can be seen that political interests and guarantees can be variable. The main factor in the corrections was the White House policy. Depending on the change of course and reading the intentions of the United States, adjustments were made in relations with each other. This was particularly true for China and Russia, which were in the triangle of the US, China and Russia after the Cold War. This fact and their links with the United States is written about by Alexander Yakovlev. China, unlike Russia, left more room for manoeuvre. China was important for Russia not only as a political and economic partner but as a force against the United States. The Chinese, on the other hand, understood the strategic partnership as: not for the alliance, not for confrontation, and not for the direction against someone. This person, in particular, was the United States, which gave an opportunity for China's economic development, so much needed with such a large population in China. The final stage before the end of the 20th century is a time defined by a "strategic partnership". The idea was to create strong ground for good relations so that they could not change too easily.

Probably they will not change, because in his conclusion Russian Andrei Davydov writes "...USA, China and Russia and the starting point of building the relations between them in a new geopolitical situation, when America began to gradually lose its status as global hegemon, and China started transforming itself from a regional to one of the world's leading global powers" [Давыдов: 399]. Rogachev writes that it is necessary to cover the old and open and confirm new perspectives. Both nations are repairing their economic situation after the economy of previous years [Рогачёв: 44–45]. Russia's cooperation with China was important to strengthen the entire region in Asia. Yakovlev, on the other hand, emphasizes that for the United States a real idea of a world in which they would cease to dominate and reign seemed to be unbearable in the United States.

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